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PARTIES 
The names of the original parties to this action are contained in the caption of 
this brief. However, only Debbie A. Burke remains a Defendant in this instant 
action. 
"Defendant/5 hereinafter refers to Debbie A. Burke, the sole owner named on the 
fee simple title of the real property at issue. 
"Plaintiff/5 hereinafter refers to Mark D. Bergman, the carpenter/handyman hired 
by the Defendant and Vince Isbell (hereinafter "Defendant's Agent55) to 
complete various projects to the interior and exterior of the Defendant's real 
property and home thereon. 
Others of Significant Interest 
"Defendant's Agent/5 (as defined above) is the Defendant's husband, a trial 
witness for the Defendant, wrote, endorsed, and cashed the check that is the 
foundation for the Plaintiff's 60(b) motion. The Defendant's Agent was also 
charged with the oversight of the work performed by the Plaintiff for the 
Defendant. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is within the general jurisdiction of Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2) 
(j) and does not involve any matter or issue within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Utah Supreme Court. After opinion the Utah Supreme Court, ordered this appeal 
transferred to this Utah Appellate Court by order dated September 29,2008. 
AUTHORITY FOR FEDERAL CASE LAW RELIANCE 
The Plaintiffs reliance on the State of Utah and U.S. Federal case law 
throughout this opinion is appropriate. See State v. Rothlisberger, 2004 UT App 
226, PI4, 95 P.3d 1193 ("In circumstances in which Utah courts have not 
definitively addressed an issue, it is appropriate to turn to decisions . . . that interpret 
related federal rules for guidance."), cert, granted, 106 P.3d 743 (Utah 2004) 
(quoting from Nat'l Advertising Co. v Murray City Corp. et. al., 131 P.3d 872 (2006 
UT App)). 
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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
STANDARD OF REVIEW - DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The primary issues to be determined on appeal include the following: 
Issue (A): Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion on or about May 12,2008, 
when it moved sua sponte and stayed the Plaintiffs 60(b) motion? 
Standard of review: We review rule 60(b) determinations under an abuse of 
discretion standard. 
Determinative law: Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 62. Stay of proceedings to enforce a 
judgment. ~ (b) Stay on motion for a new trial or for judgment. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-2-223. Decisions to be rendered within two months. ~ 
(1) A trial court judge shall decide all matters submitted for final 
determination within two months of submission, unless circumstances 
causing the delay are beyond the judge's personal control. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-5-102 (Superseded 01/01/09). Jurisdiction -- Appeals. 
(1) The district court has original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, 
not excepted in the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law. 
(4) The district court has jurisdiction over all matters properly filed in the 
circuit court prior to July 1, 1996. 
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'"A trial court has discretion in determining whether a movant has shown 
[rule 60(b) grounds], and this Court will reverse the trial court's ruling only 
when there has been an abuse of discretion."1 Ostler v. Buhler, 957 P.2d 205, 
206 (Utah 1998) (quoting Larsen v. Collina, 684 P.2d 525 54 (Utah 1984)). 
(quoting from Oseguera v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2003 UT App 46.) 
Baker v. Western Sur. Co., 757 P.2d 878 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), We further 
held that if the district court finds the motion to be without merit, it may enter 
an order denying the motion, and the parties may appeal from that order. 
Issue (B) : Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion when it elected to not inform the 
Plaintiff or issue a court order detailing the grounds for the stay? 
Standard of review: We review rule 60(b) determinations under an abuse of 
discretion standard. 
Determinative law: "Stay" As defined in Barron's Law Dictionary, Third Edition 
~ STAY a judicial order whereby some action is forbidden or held in abeyance until 
some event occurs or the court lifts its order. 
Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 62. Stay of proceedings to enforce a judgment. 
~ (b) Stay on motion for a new trial or for judgment. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-2-223. Decisions to be rendered within two months. ~ 
(1) A trial court judge shall decide all matters submitted for final 
determination within two months of submission, unless circumstances 
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causing the delay are beyond the judge's personal control. 
Bakerv. Western Sur. Co., 757 P.2d fc7fc (\Jtah Cl App. \9Sfc), We f u s t a 
held that if the district court finds the motion to be without merit, it may enter 
an order denying the motion, and the parties may appeal from that order. 
Issue (C) : Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion and/or commit a crime and/or 
divest its jurisdiction over the 60(b) motion when the Trial Court violated Utah 
Code Ann. § 78A-2-223(l)? 
Standard of review: We review rule 60(b) determinations under an abuse of 
discretion standard. 
Peterminative law: Utah Code Ann.§76-2-304.Ignorance or mistake of fact or law. 
(2) Ignorance or mistake concerning the existence or meaning of a penal law 
is no defense to a crime unless: 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-2-411. Crimes. 
Any violation of the provisions of this chapter, except Section 78A-2-404, is 
a misdemeanor. 
Bakery. Western Sur. Co., 757 P.2d 878 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), We further 
held that if the district court finds the motion to be without merit, it may enter 
an order denying the motion, and the parties may appeal from that order. 
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^ - z ri rial Court abuse its discretion (after it violated V 6. \ ~-~.--. f 
when it issued a ruling upon the 60(b) motion? 
a . vv ithout showing thai i 
b. without showing .:, .. . . „.-:.•* ;<r .-* -J ^ J I ^ delay were legally 
beyond tne j uug. .« H. •- —. 
c. \ - : ":: procedures from the Utah Judicial Council? 
S111 (: i i t" " ' ^w. Vv'e review rule 60(b) determinations under an abuse of 
discretion standard. 
Determinative law: Utah Code Ann. § /8/Y-J1-223 U a i IIOIV. I. -1»h ivnrlered within 
two months . - Procedures for CKXI, *... • - -irU-* J 
I i i \ trial ccmil judgi sh-nll «iln ul< ill matters submitted for final 
-...-..! i- . - . v thin two months of submission, iin less circumstances 
causing the delay are beyond the judge's personal control 
(2) The Judicial Council shall establish reporting procedures lor -TS 
not decided within two months oi i ;,.„. ._ *:. 
n[T]he initial inquiry tji an) : he to determine whether the 
reMU--.*•* . jurisdiction." Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 
767 p VI 560, S70 (Utah C t App. li>89). " M i e n a matter is oiuside me 
c o u r t
f
s jurisdiction it retains only the authority to dismiss the aciii i I > I 
(Quoting from AKJ v. State fin re DEC J) 2008 UT App 341) 
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Issue (E) : Did the Trial Court exceed the bounds of sound discretion in denying 
Plaintiffs 60(b) motion, without reviewing all of the evidence, without a hearing or 
without considering any argument from the opposing party? 
Standard of review: We review rule 60(b) determinations under an abuse of 
discretion standard. 
Determinative law: Canon 3. 
(5). A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice. A judge 
shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct manifest 
bias or prejudice 
(7) A judge shall accord to every person who is legally interested in a 
proceeding, or that person's lawyer, full right to be heard according to law. 
Except as authorized by law, a judge shall neither initiate nor consider, and 
shall discourage, ex parte or other communications concerning a pending or 
impending proceeding. 
(8) A judge shall dispose of all judicial matters promptly, efficiently, and 
fairly. 
C. (1) A judge shall diligently discharge the judge's administrative 
responsibilities without bias or prejudice, maintain professional competence 
injudicial administration, 
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-'• • >•; '• k Vr\ the Trial Court abuse its discretion when , ;.:.a.,.« ... , 
{ idintiff s evidence fails to prove that the I ;-,uuu,i - '• - - J * * 
testimony." 
Standard of review i : ^ terminations under an abuse of 
discretion standard. 
I" .""if" i !«M.-.i;iii«i'!" i iv Canon 3. 
{^  | A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias o
 ; -: i.. • . . 
Our supreme court has dciioed pi iin,*i locie evidence" as follows: "'Such 
evidence as, in ihcjudginnii oi'lliii Lnw is sufficient to establish a given fact, 
or !! 11;' v 1111!! i j ' i, I j; i 11 i! j!"' facts constituting the party's claim or depose, and • • 
• *ioi lebutted or contradicted, will remain suff u 
631 P.2d 861, 864 (Utah 1981) (citation omitu *, •*• ..v.. i ;auj : 
Constr., Inc. v. Kampros, 9 
It is well settled U'ui
 r . ^ - •. ; • -: native defense, and that the party 
ciaii-iijij, [.\ _ '•• '-.'.irden of proving it. Scott v. Austin, 47 Utah 248, 
1 :i "> I1 1178; Filice v. Biscardl 67 Utah 171, 246 P. 53D. See, also, -
680, "Payments," § 176. And as to judgments see 34 • I. f>u I I 0 / !. 
(quotingMarks v. Mark-, I '.'-in ' 11 i n/i \*jK\ ,",u'7). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case came for trial on November 13, 2007, before the Honorable Parley 
R. Baldwin, on the Plaintiffs single cause of action relating to the foreclosure of a 
mechanic's lien recorded upon the Defendant's real property, pursuant to which the 
Plaintiff claimed to have a legal interest in the Defendant's real property and the 
home thereon. After a two-day bench trial, Judge Baldwin requested the parties 
submit closing arguments in writing, due to lack of available time of the Court. 
On or about January 16, 2008, the Trial Court entered its final Judgment 
pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 54 on the record. 
On or about January 24, 2008, the Plaintiff filed a motion pursuant to Utah R. 
Civ. P. Rule 59(a)(6), requesting the Trial Court to consider altering or amending its 
judgment of January 16, 2008. 
On or about April 3, 2008, the Plaintiff filed a motion, memorandum, and 
affidavit with the Trial Court, pursuant to the Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 60(b), requesting 
relief from the Trial Court's judgment of January 16, 2008, due to fraud committed 
on the court. 
, On or about April 7, 2008, the Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal with the Trial 
Court (Utah Appeal Case No. 20080323-CA), taken from the entire judgment 
entered on January 16, 2008. 
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On or about April 21, 2008, the Plaintiff pursuant to Utah ^ '. .. • . •.. ...3 
7(d), filed a Request to Submit for Decision winniici u,.,,! ,,., . . s ;:••-/, . 
whereas the computation oi lime iiaa expjrc*. .:
 ; •-
the Plaintiff requested III-/ lYiul 1 ' > ul . tuisid<Ttlk* mull -'os^d, and pleadings 
i'i iniplili', The Defendant Hid i nl file a timd v reply memorandum or oppose this 
innlion. 
On or about July 1, 2008, the Plaintiff discovered that, on or about i .. 
2008, counsel for the defense communicated ex-parte with the 11 ml Jm li> 
requesting the Trial J udge sign ium \ 1f | f< "JII^ |>n " n " * « "" m " I hr Plaintiff 
subseque,:„r, ....M:.. JiuL >< IUJIM1 hanspiro^ concerning ^ ± i^xxuiFs pending 
, • * • decision was made by the Trial Court to remove the Plaintiffs 
;
~- • :noiion iruiii under advisement, without any communication or notice to the 
Plaintiff. 
Furthermore, the * «UM .-^ va^ c also elected not lu aJdics;, (lir Mtfh) 111 • 111 >n 1, and 
stayed the Plainti 1 ,,,-_s_^ i - >uv • : - * '.vision from the Supreme 
'" - - i l l . 
Hie Trial Court issued no memorandum decision, no court, orders, and no 
documentation disclosing this action, the only evidence that such actions a.. . : . - •-. 
the entries on the case docket, as the case record discloses in illung. 
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THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT DISCLOSE 
THE STAY TO THE PLAINTIFF. 
When the Trial Judge learned that the Plaintiff had discovered the stay, 
months after it had been entered, and was communicating with the Utah Court 
Administration, the Utah Judicial Council, and the Utah Judicial Conduct 
Commission concerning the Trial Judge's violation of several Utah State Codes and 
Utah Court Rules, Judge Baldwin changed his position on or about August 7, 2008 
(108 days after the Plaintiff filed the Request to Submit), seized the Plaintiffs 60(b) 
motion and denied it. 
This appeal followed. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The dates May 12 and May 13, 2008, play a very important role throughout 
the following brief, and the Plaintiff requests that such date be given special 
interest. One reason that May 12, 2008, is of interest to this action, the Plaintiffs 
primary Docketing Statement for Utah Appellate Court Case No. 200800323-CA 
became due on May 12, 2008 (SEE; Utah Supreme Court Order of April 29, 2008). 
All parties to the said appeal are the same parties to the present appeal at issue, and 
all parties are made aware of the filing deadlines by the Appeals court. 
On or about July 1, 2008, the Plaintiff obtained a current copy of the case 
docket. Examination of the docket revealed that on or about May 12, 2008, counsel 
for the Defense communicated ex-parte with the Trial Judge, and such 
communication resulted in the following events, none of which was disclosed or 
communicated to the Plaintiff: 
May 12, 2008 
1. The Trial Clerk made two (2) separate entries stating that Judge Baldwin 
signed and filed four (4) court orders. The Trial Court received these orders 
twenty-five (25) days earlier on or about April 18, 2008, and the Plaintiff had 
inquired several times as to their status, and was told time and time again, 
when the Judge gets time he will sign them. The Plaintiffs efforts seemed to 
fall on deaf ears at the court. 
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May 12,2008 
2. The Trial Judge requested the Trial Clerk to make an entry on the docket 
"Tracking ended for under advisement" (removing the Plaintiffs 60(b) 
motion from under advisement). 
May 12,2008 
3. The Trial Judge requested the Trial Clerk to make an entry on the docket 
"Request to submit for decision is staved until there is a decision from the 
Supreme Court," (the Trial Judge stayed the Plaintiffs 60(b) motion). The 
Trial Judge also elected not to issue a court order, memorandum, or any 
documentation concerning this stay. The only record of this ever happening 
is on the case docket. 
May 12,2008 
4. The next entry on the case docket, Fee Account created: Total Due: $2.00 
Payment Received: $2.00. (charge for a Court Clerk to make copies for 
Defense Counsel). 
May 13,2008 
5. The next entry on the case docket, Filed: Notice of Appeal (Defense Counsel 
files Notice of Appeal on behalf of the Defendant). 
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The Plaintiff received by mail a copy of the Defendant's Notice of Appeal on 
or about May 14, 2008. Attached thereto as Defendant's Exhibit "B" is a copy of 
the four (4) court orders that are STAMPED NOT SIGNED on May 12, 2008. 
An examination of the actual court orders on record at the court are in fact 
signed by the Trial Judge, only the handwriting is very different where April is 
scratched out and May is written in and the date 12th is also hand written, the real 
court orders carry a different page placement of the date stamps, and they carry a 
stamp on their face of the date filed on the record. The court orders on record with 
the court are NOT the same documents that Defense Counsel attached as Exhibit 
"B" to the Defendant's Notice of Appeal. 
To examine the difference between the handwriting of the Trial Judge's and 
the handwriting on the fake court orders is very easy. Defendant's Exhibit "A" 
attached to the same Notice of Appeal is the Trial Judge's hand written 21 day of 
February. 
Further evidence that makes this entire incident viable and a highly likely 
scenario of the actual events that occurred when the Plaintiff questioned the Chief 
Deputy Clerk of the Court. The Plaintiff was advised, after checking the Trial 
Judge's court log, that the Judge was not on the bench on May 12, 2008. 
Other facts surrounding the STAMPED Court Orders that are attached to the 
Defendant's Notice of Appeal that are also significant: 
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1. The Trial Court did not mail copies of the stamped or signed orders to the 
parties. It is not possible that Defense Counsel could have received the 
orders by mail in Salt Lake City and subsequently have the Defendant's 
Notice of Appeal filed with the Weber County Trial Court less than a full day 
later at 1:36 PM on May 13, 2008. The U.S. Mail Carrier for the Defense 
Counsel's address has confirmed to the Plaintiff, the address listed for the 
Defense Counsel is in fact a late afternoon drop. The earliest possible time 
that Defense Counsel could have received a mailed notice was late afternoon 
of May 13,2008. 
2. There is not another entry on the court docket that copies were made again on 
or about the dates in question. 
3. The only way for the Defense Counsel to have copies of the stamped orders, 
is if the Defense Counsel was at the Trial Court when the orders were 
stamped. 
4. Regardless of motives, the Defendant in concert with its Counsel plotted to 
cause the Plaintiff harm during trial. It appears that Defense Counsel has 
involved an officer of the court based on the activity noted on the docket on 
May 12, 2008. Not only were these actions a violation of court rules and 
Utah law, the Plaintiffs case has been prejudiced and the impartial functions 
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of the court have been directly corrupted. 
5. Who benefited by the Plaintiffs 60(b) motion being stayed? The Trial Judge 
does have some motives, as the Plaintiffs 60(b) motion attacks the very heart 
of the credibility of the Trial Court's credibility findings. However, the 
Defendant certainly had more to lose and the actions at issue here beg the 
Court's review for possible sanctions relating to fraud, subordination of 
perjury and submitting false evidence. 
Upon discovery of these events, the Plaintiff became concerned as to the 
ethics of the Trial Judge. It is apparent from the docket that the Trial Judge 
willfully, knowingly and with intent violated court rules, broke the law, violated the 
sanctity and integrity of the bench, caused material harm to the Plaintiff and, 
engineered a break down of the judicial process to aid Defendant in the case. 
This issue becomes apparent from a review of the docket, that the Defense 
Counsel met with the Trial Judge ex-parte on May 12, 2008, and the Trial Judge 
made a decision concerning the Plaintiffs 60(b) motion. 
Upon learning the above the Plaintiff inquired of the Trial Clerk as to the 
background on the stay requesting documentation of the action. The Clerk advised 
the Plaintiff that "the court lacked jurisdiction because the case is under appeal," 
further advising that the Judge had instructed her to make the entries on the docket. 
On or about July 16, 2008, after unsuccessfully pursuing answers from the 
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Court Administrator, the Plaintiff also learned that its complaint to the Utah Judicial 
Conduct Commission was stalled because the commission was waiting for new 
appointments and three reaffirmations. The Plaintiff then contacted Mr. Brent 
Johnson, Lead Counselor for the Utah Judicial Council. The Plaintiff explained the 
situation to Mr. Johnson advising that he believed the Trial Court and the Judge 
appeared to be in violation of: Utah Code Ann. § 78A-2-223(l). A trial court judge 
shall decide all matters submitted for final determination within two months of 
submission, unless circumstances causing the delay are beyond the judge's personal 
control. (Underline added). 
The Plaintiff further explained that he contacted the Utah Judicial Council for 
assistance because of: Utah Code Ann. § 78A-2-223(2). The Judicial Council shall 
establish reporting procedures for all matters not decided within two months of final 
submission (underline added). 
Mr. Johnson assured the Plaintiff that he would assist if he could. Thereafter, 
on or about July 30, 2008, Mr. Johnson informed the Plaintiff by phone, that he had 
contacted the Trial Judge and inquired as to the issue of the Trial Judge's refusal to 
issue a decision on the Plaintiffs 60(b) motion, Mr. Johnson stated that the Judge 
informed him that the court lacked jurisdiction over the motion because the case is 
under appeal. Mr. Johnson also told the Plaintiff that the Trial Judge said that if the 
Plaintiff would withdraw his appeal the Trial Court could then handle the 60(b) 
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motion. 
On August 4, 2008, the Plaintiff wrote a second letter to Mr. Johnson (the 
first letter presented Utah ease law and the rules proving the court was in error), and 
copied the same to Ms. Pat Bartholomew, a Utah Supreme Court Clerk. (SEE: 
Exhibit "A" attached hereto). In such communication the Plaintiff states: 
P a g e H 2 
"I believe the rules and laws are clear, Judge Baldwin has made a major miss-
step. I believe Judge Baldwin's jurisdiction issue is clearly false ~" 
Page H 4 
"Last Friday, August 1 2008,1 received my notice from the Appeals Court 
that I am to start writing my brief for my Appeal. With that notice, I also 
received a copy of the court record. Upon reviewing the record, I discovered 
that all mention of what has happened to my motion is missing from the 
record. Including any mention that my motion has been stayed, thus the 
appeals court will never know that it existed. Brent, that is obstruction of 
justice, and the Judge has no right to deny me justice." 
Mr. Johnson forwarded the Plaintiffs letter to the Trial Judge on that same 
day, and the Trial Judge denied the 60(b) motion three (3) days later. This action 
leaves little doubt that the Trial Judge knew all along that the Trial Court retained 
jurisdiction over 60(b) motions while the case was under appeal, and that the Trial 
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Court was operating with reckless disregard for the truth and justice. As further 
shown within the Trial Court's ruling; "The Court elected not to address the 
motion, " (emphasis added), the Trial Judge was bias and abused its discretion, as it 
is a well-established that: 
ff[T]he initial inquiry of any court should always be to determine whether the 
requested action is within its jurisdiction.'1 Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 
767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). "When a matter is outside the 
court's jurisdiction it retains only the authority to dismiss the action." Id. 
(Quoting from AKJ v. State (In re PECO 2008 UT App 341) 
Thus, the Trial Court had no authority or jurisdiction to elect not to address 
the motion. Therefore, on May 12, 2008, when the Trial Court determined that it 
lacked jurisdiction to rule on the Plaintiffs 60(b) motion, and took it out from under 
advisement, then stayed the Request to Submit (be it right or be it wrong), the Trial 
Court divested itself of jurisdiction over the motion. Hence, "When a matter is 
outside the courtfs jurisdiction it retains only the authority to dismiss the action." 
(Quoting from AKJ v. State On re DECJ) 2008 UT App 341). 
The Trial Court only retained the authority to dismiss the action therefore the 
ruling of August 7, 2008, is void. SEE: United States v. Buck, 2002 10CIR 260, 
281 F.3d 1336, Appellants claim that the quiet title judgment should be set aside 
under Rule 60(b)(4) because the judgment is void. A judgment is void "only if the 
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court which rendered it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter, or of the parties, or 
acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law." In re Four Seasons Sec. 
Laws Litis., 502 F.2d 834, 842 (10th Cir. 1974). 
As stated in United States v. Buck. 2002 10CIR 260, 281 F.3d 1336 "or acted 
in a manner inconsistent with due process of law." The Trial Court's improper 
actions divested itself of jurisdiction over the motion, making any ruling void. 
Once the Trial Court started down that slippery slope with the Defense 
Counsel, there was no coming back. Thus, all the safeguards within the judicial 
system that have been put into place over the years became impaired and at risk. 
SEE: Stonger v Sorrell 776 NE.2d 353, 358 (Ind. 2002). Nevertheless, fraud may 
be found in the absence of an intent to defraud; indeed, fraud may be found even 
where representations are made with a good faith belief in their truth. Whether the 
deprivation of a party's rights by actions of the court are attributable to a willful 
intent to defraud or a reckless disregard of rules or statutory provisions, the court 
has the same duty to rectify the wrong. The mechanism for protecting an [sic] 
maintaining the decisional integrity of our judicial system is found in the statutes 
and rules which govern the procedures to be followed by parties, attorneys and 
judges. The purposeful or reckless disregard of those procedural safeguards which 
results in the deprivation of substantive rights constitutes an impermissible 
corruption of the court process. 
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12 Moore's Federal Practice, f 60.21[4][a], at 60-52 (3d ed. 2000), provides: 
"Fraud on the court" is defined in terms of its effect on the judicial process, not in 
terms of the content of a particular misrepresentation or concealment. Fraud on the 
court must involve more than injury to a single litigant; it is limited to fraud that 
"seriously" affects the integrity of the normal process of adjudication. Fraud on the 
court is limited to fraud that does, or at least attempts to, "defile the court itself or 
that is perpetrated by officers of the court "so that the judicial machinery can not 
perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases." 
Id. (footnote references omitted)(emphasis in original). 
The Trial Court acted as if, and made statements to the effect, that it lacked 
jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs 60(b) motion. Yet, the jurisdiction issue proved not 
to be true as evidenced by the Trial Court's action on or about August 7, 2008, when 
the Trial Court acted without regard for jurisdiction, or to its violations of 78A-2-
223(1), without explaining that the delays were beyond the judge's personal control, 
without notice to the parties, without removing the self imposed stay, without a 
hearing, abruptly moved again and denied the Plaintiffs 60(b) motion stating; 
On April 3, 2008, Plaintiff filed a motion under rule 60(b) for relief from the 
Court's judgment of January 16, 2008. Having considered the affidavit of 
Mr. Bergman and his memorandum, the Court denies the motion. 
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On April 7, 2008, only four days after the Plaintiffs 60(b) motion was filed, 
Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal taken from the entire judgment The Court 
elected not to address the motion, following t(the general rule that the trial 
court is divested of jurisdiction over a case while it is under advisement on 
appeal" Natl Advertising Co. v Murray City Corp. etal, 131 P.3d 872, 876 
(Utah Ct App. 2006). The Court has learned, however, that the Utah 
Supreme Court acknowledges an exception to this rule, which is that "trial 
courts do have jurisdiction to consider rule 60(b) motions even though an 
appeal is pending. " Id. at 877 Therefore, the Court now considers Plaintiff's 
rule 60(b) motion, (emphasis added). 
Wherefore, the Trial Court has exceeded its authority, abused its discretion, 
violated the Plaintiffs rights to due process and as such, it is the duty of this Court 
to reverse the ruling, SEE; Oseguera v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2003 UT App 46. mA 
trial court has discretion in determining whether a movant has shown [rule 60(b) 
grounds], and this Court will reverse the trial court's ruling only when there has 
been an abuse of discretion."1 Ostler v. Buhler, 957 P.2d 205, 206 (Utah 1998) 
(quoting Larsen v. Collina. 684 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 1984)). 
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Kendall Insurance v. R&R Group, 2008 UT App 235 
A further example of how the Trial Court abused its discretion concerning the 
Plaintiffs 60(b) motion, would be to compare it to a similar case. Hence, SEE: 
Kendall Insurance v. R&R Group. 2008 UT App 235, 
1. Exactly as in the Plaintiffs case, the same Judge presided (the Honorable 
Parley R. Baldwin), 
2. Exactly as in the Plaintiffs case, a party filed a motion pursuant to Utah R. 
Civ. P. Rule 60(b) with the Trial Court (on or about May 26, 2006). 
3. Exactly as in the Plaintiffs case, the same party that filed the 60(b) motion 
also soon after filed an appeal based on the entire final judgment (on or about 
June 16, 2006, case No. 20060570 - CA). 
4. CONTRARY to the Plaintiffs case, in the Kendall Insurance v. R&R Group 
case, the Trial Court treats the 60(b) motion completely different. The Trial 
Court did not make-up any jurisdictional issues, nor did it stay the 60(b) 
motion before it ruled on the motion. 
Therefore, what the Kendall Insurance v. R&R Group case proves in relation 
to the Plaintiffs case: 
1. That the Trial Court knew that it was wrong staying the Plaintiffs motion as 
it tried an almost identical set of proceedings two (2) years earlier. 
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2. That when the Trial Court told the Plaintiff and Mr. Brent Johnson, "that it 
lack jurisdiction" to rule on the 60(b) motion, the Trial Court spoke with the 
knowledge that such was a complete falsehood, 
3. That when the Trial Court stated in its ruling on the Plaintiffs 60(b) motion, 
"The Court has learned, however" (emphasis added) stated such with the 
knowledge that it was another falsehood, 
4. As shown in the Kendall Insurance v. R&R Group case, the Trial Court knew 
it had jurisdiction over 60(b) motions while appeals are pending, 
5. That the Trial Court has abused its discretion and has no credibility left, 
6. The Trial Court has disparaged the judicial system in the eyes of the public. 
Therefore, it is appropriate for this court to void all findings of facts, conclusions 
of law, judgments and rulings of this Trial Court and remand the entire case for a 
new trial and that a new judge be appointed to the case. 
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RELEVANT FACTS 
EDITING THE TRIAL COURT'S CASE DOCKET 
As one of the criteria of the Utah's Judicial Council performance compliance 
standards applies to the time that cases are held under advisement, the Trial Court 
Judge is aware of the importance of this issue. Therefore, when the Trial Court 
Judge ordered the Trial Clerk to enter changes on the case docket and produced no 
documentation for the parties or the record, the Trial Court abused its discretion. 
Furthermore, just editing the case docket and doing it basically in secret, the 
Trial Court's actions are to avoid possible judicial reprimands and or to prevent 
from not meeting the minimum standards set by the judicial retention board. The 
Judge simply removed the motion from under advisement, and that tricked the 
court's motion tracker and the Judge's record is safe. 
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Please take notice that on 05-12-08 tracking is ended for under advisement 
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DETAIL OF ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT FAILS TO REPLY TIMELY 
The Defendant has refused to respond timely. There has been four (4) post-
trial motions filed and the Defendant has not met the filing time deadline once, 
including the motion at issue. Thus the Plaintiff has repeatedly insisted that the 
pleading was complete and the motion is closed. 
Nevertheless, it is extremely ironic that the Trail Court's ruling reads as if it 
is from the Defendant's late reply. Even though, the Trial Court states that it only 
reviewed the Plaintiffs pleadings before making a decision on the motion. Which 
if the Trial Court reviewed the Plaintiffs pleadings, then it is the duty of the court to 
handle the crimes that happened right in front of it. 
The Plaintiff also gave the Trial Court an alternative provision with how to 
handle the false evidence the Defendant provided, that being, do not allow the 
Defendant the use of cash payments as proof of payments. Which it should have 
never allowed in the first place. 
The Trial Court's review is wrong, plain and simple, as it should be based 
solely on the merits of a motion. This applies to the court's unwillingness to see 
beyond the title of the motion and look to the substance of the plea. In Hazel-Atlas 
Glass Co. v Hartford-Empire Co.. 322 U.S. 238, 64 S.Ct. 997, 88 L.Ed. 1250 
(1944). On appeal from that ruling the Supreme Court held the federal courts have 
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inherent equitable power to grant relief in cases of after-discovered fraud regardless 
of the "end of the term rule," and concluded that "every element of the fraud here 
disclosed demands the exercise of the historic power of equity to set aside 
fraudulently begotten judgments." The Court noted that this was not simply a case 
of a judgment obtained with the aid of a witness who is believed possibly to have 
been guilty of perjury, but was "a deliberately planned and carefully executed 
scheme to defraud not only the Patent Office but the Circuit Court of Appeals." Id. 
At 245, 64 S.Ct. At 1001. The Court rejected suggestions that a lack of diligence by 
the aggrieved party could justify denial of relief, finding that tampering with the 
administration of justice in the manner shown here involved more than an injury to 
a single litigant and that the court's power to preserve the integrity of the judicial 
process did not depend on the diligence of the litigants. Id. At 246, 64 S.Ct. At% 
1001. 
See: United States v. Buck. 2002 10CIR 260,281 F.3d 1336 stating, "In this 
case no purpose would be served by denying Appellants relief on the ground that 
the motion misstyled the plea for relief. The substance of the plea should control, 
not the label. We should construe the motion either as an independent action, see 12 
Moore's § 60.64, at 60-197; 11 Wright & Miller § 2868, at 405, or, because "there 
are no formal requirements for asserting a claim of fraud on the court," 12 Moore's 
§ 60.21 [4][f], at 60-60, as a pleading invoking the court's inherent power to grant 
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relief for fraud upon the court." 
Nonetheless, the Plaintiffs 60(b) motion is not a complicated issue, but it is 
founded on material conclusive prima facie evidence that proves the Defendant and 
Counsel collaborated to commit fraud upon the court. When it looked as if the 
Plaintiff discovered such treachery, the Defense Counsel went to the Trial Court and 
communicated ex-parte with the Trial Judge and hatched the scheme of May 12, 
2008. 
Fraud on the court . . . is fraud which is directed to the judicial machinery 
itself and is not fraud between the parties or fraudulent documents, false statements 
or perjury. It has been held that allegations of nondisclosure in pretrial discovery 
will not support an action for fraud on the court. It is thus fraud... where the 
impartial functions of the court have been directly corrupted. Bulloch v. United 
States, 763 F.2d 1115, 1121 (10th Cir. 1985). As stated in Weese v. Schukman, 98 
F.3d 542, 552-53 (10th Cir. 1996), 
Generally speaking, only the most egregious misconduct, such as bribery of a 
judge or members of a jury, or the fabrication of evidence by a party in which an 
attorney is implicated will constitute a fraud on the court. Less egregious 
misconduct, such as nondisclosure to the court of facts allegedly pertinent to the 
matter before it, will not ordinarily [* 12] rise to the level of fraud on the court. 
(quoting Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332, 1338 (5th Cir. 1978)) (emphasis 
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deleted). 
Moreover, "fraud on the court," whatever else it embodies, requires a 
showing that one has acted with an intent to deceive or defraud the court. A proper 
balance between the interests underlying finality on the one hand and allowing relief 
due to inequitable conduct on the other makes it essential that there be a showing of 
conscious wrongdoing-what can properly be characterized as a deliberate scheme to 
defraud-before relief from a final judgment is appropriate . . . . Thus, when there is 
no intent to deceive, the fact that misrepresentations were made to a court is not of 
itself a sufficient basis for setting aside a judgment under the guise of "fraud on the 
court." Robinson v. Audi Aktiengesellschaft 56 F.3d 1259, 1267 (10th Cir. 1995). 
Proof of fraud upon the court must be by clear and convincing evidence. See Weese, 
98F.3dat552 
Weese v. Schukman, 98 F.3d 542, 552-53 (10th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation 
omitted). See also. Buck, 281 F.3d at 1342 ("It has been held that allegations of 
nondisclosure in pretrial discovery will not support an action for fraud on the 
court.") These parameters are strictly applied because a finding of fraud on the court 
permits the severe consequence of allowing a party to overturn the finality of a 
judgment. Weese, 98 F.3d at 553. Intent to defraud is an "absolute prerequisite" to a 
finding of fraud on the court. Robinson v. Audi Aktiengesellschaft 56 F.3d 1259, 
1267 (10th Cir. 1995) (discussing the required intent element). See also, Yapp v. 
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Excel Com, 186 F.3d 1222, 1231 (10th Cir. 1999) (same). 
Nonetheless, it is not the Plaintiffs position that the 60(b) motion at issue 
may not have started out as a clear and convincing true case of fraud on the court, 
but what happened after the Plaintiff filed the motion, left little room for doubt 
about the truth of the Plaintiffs claims. 
The Trial Court elected not to address the motion or issue a court order, 
thereby blocking the Plaintiffs rights to an appeal. The Trial Court's only grounds 
for such actions could only be placed upon the fact the Plaintiffs motion went to 
the heart of the credibility issue, in contradiction of the Trial Court's findings of 
fact, thereby the Plaintiff was trying to level the playing field when the Appeals 
court reviews the Plaintiffs challenge of the Trial Court's finding of facts. 
The general rule that the Trial Court speaks of in its ruling has not been the 
general rule for more than twenty (20) years, as stated in: Baker v. Western Sur. 
Co., 757 P.2d 878 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), "We further held that if the district court 
finds the motion to be without merit, it may enter an order denying the motion, and 
the parties may appeal from that order." 
Additionally, in Hazel-Atlas Glass Co., 322 U.S. at 246, the Supreme Court 
of the United States held that tampering with the administration of justice involves 
far more than an injury to a single litigant. "It is a wrong against the institutions set 
up to protect and safeguard the public, institutions in which fraud cannot 
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complacently be tolerated consistently with the good order of society." Id. (quoting 
from Stonger v. Sorrell 776 NE. 2d 353, 358 (Ind. 2002)) 
During trial the Plaintiff objected and was overruled when the defense 
presented defense Exhibit D14 (as such exhibit lacked foundation and purports 
several payments without any supporting evidence), states on payment line #8, 
dated July 7, 2003, a Check from Golden West Credit Union Check #3348 for $500, 
was paid to the Plaintiff. A copy of such check (amongst others), is not in evidence. 
The 60(b) motion is the third time the Plaintiff brought a part of this same 
issue before the Trial Court. The first time was during trial, as the Plaintiff objected 
to D14 being admitted into evidence without evidence supporting all of the claims, 
other than testimony. The second time is in the Plaintiffs closing arguments (page 
7 U 3), as the Plaintiff points out that the testimony of the Defendant and her 
husband (Mr. Vince Isbell) has inconsistencies as to the payments, amounts, start 
date of work, work authorized and that the Plaintiff was to be paid for the work 
performed on their Slaterville home. 
Once the Plaintiff was able to get a copy of the check at issue, the Plaintiff 
discovered that it was not made payable to the Plaintiff. 
BEFORE THE PLAINTIFF REFERS THE COURT TO PARTS OF THE 
DEFENDANT'S LATE REPLY, THE PLAINTIFF RESERVES THE RIGHT TO 
STRIKE THE ENTIRE REPLY AT A LATER DATE. 
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Had the Defendant's husband cashed the check and then brought the Plaintiff 
the cash (as stated in the Defendant's late response page 2 ^ Response), then why 
did the Defendant not list it as a cash payment? Just like the seven (7) other cash 
payments the Defendant listed on Exhibit D14 and claimed to have paid to the 
Plaintiff. Because they were lying. 
If the Trial Court had really been interested injustice and taken an extra 
minute, located the lawsuit mentioned on page 4 f 15 in the Plaintiffs Affidavit in 
Support of Motion Presenting - (Plaintiffs 60(b)), it would have discovered that, In 
the United States District Court for the District of Utah, Case No. 2:03-CV-750 TC. 
On page 4 of the US Court's ORDER AND MEMORANDUM DECISION % E. 
Declaration of Vince Isbell (as per the 180 paragraph declaration), stating: 
"Otherwise, unless specifically addressed in this Order, the portions of Mr. Isbellfs 
Declaration are inadmissible for reasons set forth in the Defendant's briefs. 
Accordingly the court does not rely on them." 
Mr. Vince Isbell (the Defendant's Agent, Husband, and trial witness), does 
not provide reliable testimony. Yet, this Trial Court found it as the most credible. 
Thus, as the Plaintiff attacked that fact with the evidence produced in the Plaintiffs 
60(b) motion, the Trial Court did not want to discover anything else that might 
prove its findings concerning credibility were wrong. 
Appellant's/Plaintiffs 60(b) Case Brief 36 
Defense Exhibit D14 (titled - Payments made to Mark - see payment line 
No.8), confirms that the Defendant and the Defendant's (husband) witness both 
testified, under direct examination that on July 6, 2003, check #3348, issued in the 
amount of $500, drawn on their joint account at Golden West Credit Union, was 
made payable to Mark Bergman. 
The Trial Court overruled the Plaintiffs objection and allowed the Defendant 
to testify about such check, and the Trial Court relied upon the evidence, even-
though the Defendant did not produce a copy of check #3348. 
However, when the Plaintiff obtained the check and presented it by means of 
the 60(b) motion, the Trial Court could clearly see that such check was not made 
payable to the Plaintiff, but rather it is made payable to CASH and endorsed by the 
Defendant's husband, who cashed such instrument. 
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THE TRIAL COURT RETALIATES 
REFUSES TO EXAMINE EVIDENCE 
On or about April 7, 2008, the Trial Court Clerk telephoned the Plaintiff and 
requested the Plaintiff come to the courthouse and pick-up the CD the Plaintiff had 
attached to the 60(b) motion as an exhibit. The Plaintiff informed the Clerk the CD 
contained the Trial Court's video and audio footage of the Defendant and the 
Defendant's witness actual trial testimony. Because the Plaintiff had a pending 
motion before the Trial Court, the Plaintiff requested that the Trial Clerk retain the 
CD as there might not be any further form of transcripts from the trial. 
The Trial Clerk insisted regardless, well that maybe, and maybe you can use 
it at a trial or hearing but no one at the court is going to put a CD in a computer and 
watch it, and the Trial Court refuses to hold the CD in their evidence as an Exhibit 
to the Plaintiffs motion, SEE: case docket April 7, 2008, Note: CD RETURNED 
TO MARK BERGMAN. HE SET IT ON THE COUNTER AND REFUSED TO 
TAKE IT AND LEFT IT ON THE COUNTER. 
Because the Plaintiff refused to take the CD (as noted on the docket) and filed 
a Notice of Appeal, the Trial Court retaliated (even though it was in violation of the 
Utah Judicial Council Rules of Judicial Administration Rule 4-202.04(2)(D)) 
against the Plaintiff and denied the said pending motion before the close of court on 
April 7, 2008. The main violation involved with this decision is, Rule 4-202.04(2) 
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(D) requires that the court SHALL hold a hearing, and after which the court SHALL 
write a findings. 
The Plaintiffs motion met all the requirements and the Plaintiff requested a 
hearing. Only, this was not the first time the Trial Court retaliated and denied the 
Plaintiff the right to be heard. On March 4, 2008, two (2) days after the Plaintiff 
was finally granted access to copies of the Trial Exhibits, and the day after the 
Plaintiff informed the Trial Clerk that evidence was missing from Exhibit D13, the 
Trial Court denied the Plaintiffs motion pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 59(a)(6). 
Thus, the Plaintiff finds that the Trial Court is bias and has been retaliating 
for no just cause, and is abusing its discretion, when the Trial Court denied the 
60(b) motion stating it found: "The reasons applicable to the Plaintiffs motion 
include "newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been 
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b) " ~ "Plaintiff does not 
allege or show that the evidence could not have previously been discovered. " 
(emphasis added). 
Furthermore, the Trial Court knew why the Plaintiff could not have produced 
the evidence in time for a Rule 59(b) motion, one reason being the Trial Judge 
would not approve the Plaintiffs access to copies of exhibits for three (3) weeks, 
another being the Plaintiff had moved timely pursuant to Rule 59 requesting the 
court to consider altering or amending the judgment, and it was denied. Not to 
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mention, it is standard knowledge that a subpoena has to grant the subject a 
minimum of fourteen (14) days to comply. A motion pursuant to Rule 59 has to be 
done within ten (10) days from the date of final judgment. 
Within the Plaintiffs pleadings, the Plaintiff explains each step taken, the 
reason, and the time-line needed to produce the missing evidence. Nonetheless, as 
per the Trial Judge, the Kendall Insurance v. R&R Group case proves that the Trial 
Judge's statements and rulings cannot be relied upon. Hence, had the Trial Judge 
read the pleadings as implied, reviewed all the evidence (exhibit "B"), then the Trial 
Court would have known that the Plaintiff did show that the evidence could not 
have previously been discovered, and the Defendant, the Defendant's witness and 
the Counsel for the defense all committed perjury and submitted false evidence. 
The Plaintiff finds that the Trial Court abused its discretion, when the Trial 
Court found; "Plaintiff alleges that the witnesses for Defendant lied at trial And 
provides as "newly discovered" evidence of this a copy of a check However, 
Plaintiffs evidence fails to prove that Defendant's witnesses gave false testimony" 
(emphasis added). 
The Trial Court has failed to recognize what is basic prima facie evidence. 
The Plaintiff provided a check as evidence, the Defendant has admitted to writing 
and cashing the check and that the check is not made payable to the Plaintiff. 
Therefore, the said check at question is PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE and as 
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such, Our supreme court has defined "prima facie evidence11 as follows: mSuch 
evidence as, in the judgment of the law is sufficient to establish a given fact, or the 
group or chain of facts constituting the party's claim or depose, and which if not 
rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient/" State v. Asay, 631 P.2d 861, 864 
(Utah 1981) (citation omitted), (quoting from J.V. Hatch Constr., Inc. v. Kampros, 
971 P.2d 8, 15 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)). Therefore, it is not within the Trial Court's 
discretion to dispute something that is prima facie evidence, thus the Trial Court has 
abused its discretion. 
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Conclusion and Statement of Relief Sought 
For the foregoing reasons, the Trial Court's final judgment and rulings should be 
found as an abuse of its discretion and are void, thereby nullifying all findings of 
facts, conclusion of law, rulings and judgments. 
That this court finds that the use of unconfirmed payments made with cash are to 
be disallowed and not entered into evidence. 
That this court finds that the defendant is to replace the escrowed funds into the 
court upon remand, and that failure to do such shall result in findings of contempt of 
court, and ordered to show cause. 
That this court finds that the Defendant, the Defendant's witness Mr. Vince 
Isbell, and Defendant's counselor are to be brought before the court for matters 
relating to fraud on the court. 
That the Plaintiff has prevailed on appeal. 
That any and all just matters found by this court be applied. 
Wherefore, this court reverses this present action and remands the entire matter 
for a new trial before a new judge, consistent with the opinion of this court. 
Respectively submitted, 
Dated December Q , 2008 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I CERTIFY THAT ON THE O DAY OF DECEMBER, 2008 THE 
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BY MAILING A TRUE AND CORRECT COPY VIA FIRST-CLASS U.S. MAIL, 
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Respectfully, 
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Addendum A 
FACSIMILE TRANSMITTAL SHEET 
To: 
Brent Johnson / cc Pat Bartholomew 
FAX NUMBER: 
801-578-3843 / 801-578-39$% 
COMPANY: 
Judicial Council / Utah Supreme Court 
PHONE NUMBER: 
801-578-3884 
Re: 
Jurisdiction & Signature Stamp 
From: 
Mark D. Bergman 
Date: 
August 4,2008 
TOTAL NO. OF PAGES INCLUDING COVER: 
3 
SENDER'S REFERENCE NUMBER: 
Case #04092444 -Judge Baldwin 
YOUR REFERENCE NUMBER: 
[Click here and type reference number] 
• URGENT • FOR REVIEW • PLEASE COMMENT • PLEASE REPLY • PLEASE RECYCLE 
NOTES/COMMENTS: 
Dear Brent 
Please contact me or have someone from your office keep me informed as to what is your 
decision. Thank you for your time. 
Respectively^ 
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P H O N E : 801-782-8086 • FAX: 801-782-0667 
August 4, 2008 
RE: Jurisdiction and Signature Stamp 
Mr. Brent Johnson 
Judicial Counsel Legal Depart. 
S.L.C,Utah 
Dear Mr. Johnson, 
I hope that you have received my fax and voice messages concerning the signature 
stamp issues and the court's jurisdiction. I am sorry that these issues are taking up so much 
of your time but, I did not create the problem, I am just trying to set matters back on track. 
Speaking of which, I want you to understand my intent is only so I might get justice in my 
case. I am not looking for more people to sue. Believe me; I know what kind of complaint 
I could file against the Judge and his in-court clerk, but who needs the headache. 
Nonetheless, I believe the rules and laws are clear, Judge Baldwin has made a major 
miss-step. I believe Judge Baldwin's jurisdiction issue is clearly false and the improper 
stamping of the orders is a violation of the rules. However, if the Judge can prove 
otherwise, I will go away quiedy. I feel I have tried everything I could think of to give the 
Judge a way out, but he has refused repeatedly. At least I was trying until I discovered this 
fake stay I know that my motion changes everything about the findings of fact and the final 
judgment, but that kind of thing can and does happen. I am sure Judge Baldwin never 
thought that I could prove conclusively that the defendant committed perjury and that their 
Attorney subordinated the same. 
For me, it was easy, because as I listened to the defendant and her husband testify 
about the alleged payments, they paid to me, and that they could not produce a copy of one 
of the checks that they made out to me. I knew right where to go, only I tried everything 
first. I called the defendants Attorney and asked for a copy of the missing check, I brought 
it to the attention of the court that one of the checks was not in evidence. Then, being left 
with no other choice, I issued a subpoena, had the Sheriff serve it, and then I waited. When 
I received the defendant's banks records, I knew the Judge could not deny documented 
proof of the fraud committed by the defendant. Sure, the defendant had lied about a lot of 
things while the defendant and her husband were on the stand, but there is no walking away 
from this one. 
Last Friday, August 1 2008,1 received my notice from the Appeals Court that I am to 
start writing my brief for my Appeal. With that notice, I also received a copy of the court 
record. Upon reviewing the record, I discovered that all mention of what has happened to 
my motion is missing from the record. Including any mention that my motion has been 
stayed, thus the appeals court will never know that it existed. Brent, that is obstruction of 
justice, and the Judge has no right to deny me justice. 
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Therefore, this is what I will setde for. First, I believe you have grounds to put Judge 
Baldwin's in-court clerk, Debbie, on administrative leave and the court orders she improperly 
used the signature stamp on to be withdrawn. That will also require that the defendant's 
appeal be withdrawn too, as there will be no final judgment or order, the appeals court will 
have no jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Once the matter is cleared up the defendant can 
refile if they so wish. 
Judge Baldwin to set a hearing for tomorrow or the next day, starting at 10:00am will 
be fine. I do not care if he has court scheduled; he brought this thing on himself. Now he 
is going to fix it. Judge Baldwin is to order that the defendant be contacted and informed 
that they are required to attend, or they will be held in contempt. 
We will hold a hearing on my motion of which I do not think it should take us past 
lunch. One last thing, I would like you to attend, if you can. I believe Judge Baldwin will do 
what is required by law and I will feel much better about the whole thing just knowing that I 
can talk to you afterwards. After that, I do not care what the Judicial Counsel decides to do 
with the Judge and his Clerk. 
Sincerely, 
Mark D. Bergman 
CC: Pat Bartholomew 
Exhibit A 
ADDENDUM 
CONTROLLING STATUTES AND RULES VERBATIM 
The controlling provision relating to the issues of the Trial Court's abuse of 
discretion when it denied the Plaintiff's 60(b) motion, are as follows: 
Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment. 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to all 
or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the following causes; 
provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried without a jury, 
the court may open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony, 
amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and 
conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment: 
(a)(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any 
order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from 
having a fair trial. 
(a)(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors have 
been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a finding on any 
question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a determination by chance or 
as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit of any one of 
the jurors. 
(a)(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded 
against. 
(a)(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, 
which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the 
trial. 
(a)(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the 
influence of passion or prejudice. 
(a)(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it 
is against law. 
(a)(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than 10 days 
after the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is made under 
Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a 
motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served with the motion. 
The opposing party has 10 days after such service within which to serve opposing 
affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be 
served may be extended for an additional period not exceeding 20 days either by 
the court for good cause shown or by the parties by written stipulation. The court 
may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the court of 
its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it might have 
granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall specify the grounds 
therefor. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the judgment 
shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. 
Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, 
etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of 
justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or 
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not 
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud 
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other 
misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has 
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based 
has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the 
judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying 
relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a 
reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3),not more than 3 months after the 
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this 
Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. 
This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to 
relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for 
fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall 
be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action. 
Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 62. Stay of proceedings to enforce a judgment. 
(a) Delay in execution. No execution or other writ to enforce a judgment may issue 
until the expiration often days after entry of judgment, unless the court in its 
discretion otherwise directs. 
(b) Stay on motion for new trial or for judgment. In its discretion and on such 
conditions for the security of the adverse party as are proper, the court may stay the 
execution of, or any proceedings to enforce, a judgment pending the disposition of 
a motion for a new trial or to alter or amend a judgment made pursuant to Rule 59, 
or of a motion for relief from a judgment or order made pursuant to Rule 60, or of a 
motion for judgment in accordance with a motion for a directed verdict made 
pursuant to Rule 50, or of a motion for amendment to the findings or for additional 
findings made pursuant to Rule 52(b). 
(c) Injunction pending appeal. When an appeal is taken from an interlocutory order 
or final judgment granting, dissolving, or denying an injunction, the court in its 
discretion may suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction during the pendency 
of the appeal upon such conditions as it considers proper for the security of the 
rights of the adverse party. 
(d) Stay upon appeal. When an appeal is taken, the appellant by giving a 
supersedeas bond may obtain a stay, unless such a stay is otherwise prohibited by 
law or these rules. The bond may be given at or after the time of filing the notice of 
appeal. The stay is effective when the supersedeas bond is approved by the court. 
(e) Stay in favor of the state, or agency thereof. When an appeal is taken by the 
United States, the state of Utah, or an officer or agency of either, or by direction of 
any department of either, and the operation or enforcement of the judgment is 
stayed, no bond, obligation, or other security shall be required from the appellant. 
(f) Stay in quo warranto proceedings. Where the defendant is adjudged guilty of 
usurping, intruding into or unlawfully holding public office, civil or military, within 
this state, the execution of the judgment shall not be stayed on an appeal. 
(g) Power of appellate court not limited. The provisions in this rule do not limit any 
power of an appellate court or of a judge or justice thereof to stay proceedings or to 
suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction, or extraordinary relief or to make 
any order appropriate to preserve the status quo or the effectiveness of the 
judgment subsequently to be entered. 
(h) Stay of judgment upon multiple claims. When a court has ordered a final 
judgment on some but not all of the claims presented in the action under the 
conditions stated in Rule 54(b), the court may stay enforcement of that judgment 
until the entering of a subsequent judgment or judgments and may prescribe such 
conditions as are necessary to secure the benefit thereof to the party in whose favor 
the judgment is entered. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-2-223. Decisions to be rendered within two months — 
Procedures for decisions not rendered. 
(1) A trial court judge shall decide all matters submitted for final 
determination within two months of submission, unless circumstances 
causing the delay are beyond the judge's personal control. 
(2) The Judicial Council shall establish reporting procedures for all 
matters not decided within two months of final submission. 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-5-102 (Superseded 01/01/09). Jurisdiction -Appeals. 
(1) The district court has original jurisdiction in all matters civil and 
criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law. 
(4) The district court has jurisdiction over all matters properly filed in the 
circuit court prior to July 1, 1996. 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session 
Amended by Chapter 115, 2008 General Session 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-304. Ignorance or mistake of fact or law. ~ 
(2) Ignorance or mistake concerning the existence or meaning of a penal law 
is no defense to a crime unless: 
Amended by Chapter 32, 1974 General Session 
Utah Code Ann. §78A-2-411. Crimes. 
Any violation of the provisions of this chapter, except Section 78A-2-404, is 
a misdemeanor. 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session 
Chapter 12. Code of Judicial Conduct. 
Canon 3. A judge shall perform the duties of the office impartially and diligently. 
(5). A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice. A judge 
shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct manifest 
bias or prejudice 
(7). A judge shall accord to every person who is legally interested in a 
proceeding, or that person's lawyer, full right to be heard according to law. 
Except as authorized by law, a judge shall neither initiate nor consider, and 
shall discourage, ex parte or other communications concerning a pending or 
impending proceeding. 
(8) A judge shall dispose of all judicial matters promptly, efficiently, and 
fairly. 
C. (1) A judge shall diligently discharge the judge's administrative 
responsibilities without bias or prejudice, maintain professional competence 
injudicial administration, 
Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 3.3. Candor Toward the Tribunal, 
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly: 
(a)(1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a 
false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the 
lawyer; 
(a)(2) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling 
jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the 
client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or 
(a)(3) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. -
